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Abstract 
The history of Albanian Constitutions dates back in April 1914 with the Statute of Albania drafted by a National Committee of 
that time. The new Albanian Constitution was adopted by the Parliament 18 years ago and confirmed by a Referendum1, 
becoming the first democratic Constitution following political changes in Albania. After 1991, the stature of Albania changed 
significantly and the country managed to build new democratic institutions, advanced in establishing a market economy and 
ensuring human rights, and made important steps towards integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. In this context, constitutional 
changes were normal, despite the overall misperception that the Constitution is a document that must not be amended. So, a 
provisional package of amendments was drafted to avoid obstacles along the way, and a new Constitution was adopted in 
1998, later on amended in 2012 and 2016. Analysis of such amendments points out some problems. What should be the 
procedure for constitutional changes? Parliamentary vote or referendum? In this view, the 2012 constitutional changes - albeit 
hasty - did not affect the backbone of the document and could be introduced without a referendum, simply with a parliamentary 
adoption, as was the case. In contrast, the 2016 amendments were adopted unanimously, but they affected the backbone of 
the Constitution and therefore a referendum should have been called. Should the impact of such amendments be measured? 
This is another important issue that is not considered actually. But, in our opinion, monitoring any amendments by the 
Parliament or the President of the Republic is to the benefit of democratic developments and serves any further intentions for 
constitutional changes. We believe that the Constitution should clearly prescribe the procedure for constitutional changes to 
save them from becoming a pawn of momentary political interests. 
1. The Constitutional Amendments – Theory and Practice
The debate on the need for frequent amendments to the Constitution remains open in Albania. Should constitutional 
amendments be made? If yes, through what procedure? When can the referendum be used as a legal instrument? What 
must be the Parliament's role in these amendments? These are some of the questions raised before lawmakers. 
Supporters of changes argue that some articles of the constitution reflected Albania's specific situation after the political 
changes, but now are inadequate to the actual status of the country, particularly in combating widespread corruption in 
the justice system. This view is strongly supported even by representatives of Albania's ally countries. Opponents of 
these changes were initially against the idea of constitutional intervention arguing that the Constitution is not a document 
that can be often and easily modified. This is also the perception of a big number of Albanians who seem to lack proper 
information about this issue (see Chart 1)2. 
It is a fact that the Constitution is amended from time to time even in consolidated democracies, in order to match it 
1 Referendum for the Constitution held on 22 November 1998. 
3 UNDP social-media survey results 
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to the democratic reality. Hence, the last French Constitution of 19583 has been amended 24 times so far “to correct the 
imperfections or to modify the State's operating rules”4. Changes started since 1960, only two years from its adoption by 
popular referendum. Even the English Constitution has seen continuous modifications5. 
 
Chart 1: Most Albanians perceive Constitution as unchangeable 
 
 
 
The main problem seems to be not whether the Constitution is to be changed, but the rationale behind changes and their 
impact. Is the change dictated by momentary narrow-sighted party interests? How necessary is a proposed change? 
What concrete impact will it generate? How will it fare to the test of time? These and many other questions must be 
addressed technically and politically, before brining any proposed changes on the table. 
On the other hand, the depth of proposed changes is equally important, i.e. these aim at a constitutional overhaul, 
or just at better adapting the fundamental law to the executive reality?6 This is the key argument behind the selection of 
the adoption procedure for these changes: is the referendum necessary, or changes may simply be adopted in 
Parliament? 
 
2. Quick Solution: 1991 Constitutional Package 
 
Political changes in Albania started with the students protest in December 1990. In June 1991, political forces agreed to 
establish a joint Government called the Stability Government. The first obstacle to reforms launched by this government 
was the Constitution; designed for the previous regime, it presented many shortcomings and was not suitable to the 
market economy model. Here are some of its main shortcomings: (i) From the preface, it referred to the Communist Party 
and Party of Labour of Albania, State-owned property was considered as the only allowed form of ownership in citizens 
and villages, and sanctioned the class struggle and the fight against foreign and domestic "enemies"; (ii) it sanctioned the 
social order, i.e. the dictatorship of proletariat, a one-party system: Party of Labour – the only leading political force of the 
State and society; and construction of socialism on our own; (iii) it sanctioned the economic order: socialist economy, 
socialist ownership (State property and cooperative property) over means of production, and personal property: only 
income from labour and dwelling houses in village7; (iv) it sanctioned that the State leads and develops the whole 
economic and social life with a unique plan, State monopoly over external trade8 and any price; (v) it prohibited the 
granting of concessions and establishment of joint ventures with foreign companies, as well as foreign loans9; (vi) it made 
the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the People's Assembly the supreme authorities of the State power; and (vii) 
and sanctioned the defendant's right to defence10. 
Between the necessity for a new constitution and impossibility to set off and continue the reforms under the 
democratic system and market economy, the option chosen was a provisional package of constitutional amendments11 
                                                            
4 French Constitution of the Fifth Republic. The first constitution of France was adopted on 3 September 1791. 
5 “Peut-on modifier une Costitution?”, Paris, 2014. 
6 Nguyen-Duy I., La constitution britanique: continuete etchangement, Paris 2012. 
7 1976 Constitution. 
8 Article 23 
9 Article 27 
10Article 28 
11 Article 102 – in the sense that the person is not entitled to a lawyer, but may defend themselves. 
12 Main constitutional provisions were adopted through Law no 7491, dated 29.4.1991. 
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that would later be replaced by a new Constitution. 
The main constitutions provisions regulated the basic principles of the new democratic State: separation of powers 
and separation between State and private economy, sanctioned political pluralism, allowed the diversity of property and 
free initiative, guaranteed the right to establish joint ventures with foreign companies and repatriation of profit. The 
position of the President of the Republic was introduced by this package. The Stability government was the first having a 
chance to begin implementation of this document in terms of an unfavorable tradition and not so friendly atmosphere to 
these changes. 
The first attempt to draw up the new Constitution dates back in 1993, but the draft was rejected by popular 
referendum12. Later on, in 1998, another draft was elaborated and adopted by referendum. So, it could be said that 
democratic Albania had its constitution as of November 1998.  Since the adoption of this fundamental document wasn’t 
done any systematic, in-depth analysis by the Parliament, the President of the Republic, political parties or international 
partners 13  of how the Constitution meant and represented the rapid development in the country and how it was 
harmonised with these developments. The occasional changes arguments rely more on political than legal14  ones and 
the political arguments are still dominating. Even those who criticize the changes are mainly based on political arguments 
and party interests. 
But, one of the most serious issues of the actual Constitution is that it fails to guarantee the accountability of the 
judiciary. While it fully provides for the independence of the judicial system, the Constitution does not guarantee the 
accountability of this system at the same measure. Judicial power in Albania is a clear example of justice corporatism, 
where independence (guaranteed by the Constitution) and understood as autonomy, serves as an alibi to avoid 
accountability and combating corruption. 
Independent institutions in Albania are generally established as bi-partisan bodies, reflecting the two-party system 
installed during the transition period, or, the division into two rival blocks in a perpetual political conflict with one-another. 
In fact, instead of non-partisan institutions, in Albania we have bi-partisan institutions. In the climate of extreme distrust 
and polarity, this model does not seem to be functional. 
In the bi-partisan model, institutions are built with the principle of sharing the case, or controlling one-another. 
Experience has shown that - for this model to function - there must be a moderate level of consensus, which is lacking in 
Albania. Typical examples of these are the continuously contested Central Elections Commission, or the long-blocked 
Audiovisual Media Authority. 
In Albania, political pluralism seems to be perceived as a conflict, rather than as political dialogue; this approach 
has led to dysfunctional institutions. By paradox, albeit political parties share the same vision and opinion on crucial 
national development matters, like market economy, EU integration, NATO accession, regional cooperation policies, 
cooperation with Kosovo – the two main political blocks can hardly reach a compromise or strike a consensus when it 
comes to actual issues of domestic politics. In Albania, there is a consensus of vision, but not a consensus of action. 
Compromise is often seen as a sign of weakness, or, otherwise as a right to veto. Meanwhile, political discourse 
continues to be fierce and quite toxic, and often beyond ethical limits.  
These are the reasons why the upcoming constitutional reform must address, first and foremost, issues related to 
the independence and functioning of the judicial power, including the prosecution office, independent institutions and the 
constitutional position of the president of the Republic. 
 
3. The Subsequent Amendments 
 
The amendments of 2008, partially dealt with these major adjustments. They sanctioned the election of the President of 
the Republic by 71 votes to avoid political deadlocks, the 5-year mandate of the Prosecutor General and the regional 
proportional system for elections, in order to avoid another ‘Dushku phenomenon’. 
So, it is the general perception that the amendments touched the core of the problem, but had a negative effect on 
checks and balances, because the Constitution failed to entirely ensure real and effective parliamentary oversight on the 
                                                            
13 Referendum conducted in November 1999, with 84.3% turnover and 53% of them against  the draft. 
14 Referring mostly to the Venice Commission or the EU-financed EURALIUS programme. 
15 Krasniqi A., "Kurthet e reformës kushtetuese", Tirana, 1 May 2008. 
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government, or as critics randomly say, the parliament resembled more to the notary of the government. The 1998 
Constitution is also considered to have failed in ensuring the appropriate protection to independent institutions from the 
influence of the parliamentary political majority. 
In this way, the justice system continued to stay on unstable ground and there was a wrong expectation that the 
system would be reformed from within, or by the corrupt-perceived judges. Meanwhile, the judges continued to make 
praise to the system in their analysis, pointing out just any final shortcoming such as the judges' professional deficiencies, 
inadequate integrity, ineffective constitutional model for the appointment of judges to the High Court or the HCJ Chair 
position held by the a politically active President of the Republic that creates the premises for political pressure over the 
judiciary. According to them, the judiciary model is advanced and appropriate and therefore must not be touched, but 
rather the organic laws deriving from the Constitution and the Codes of Procedures prior to entry into force needed more 
adjustments to bring them in line with the constitutional norms and principles and European standards15. There is a clear 
intention to maintain the status quo, reflected in the judges' stance towards a justice comprehensive reform.   
Surprisingly, these changes were supported by the international partners, seemingly more inclined on the political 
stability, rather than the stability and democracy in Albania. There is no other explanation to the fact that the justice 
reform was not considered indispensable by them, and the lack of any serious strategic document assisted by them 
under this reform, at a time where public Albanian institutions - assisted by international partners – developed over 25 
strategic documents, one for virtually each sector or subsector and their Action Plans.  
 
4. Latest Changes in 2016: Justice Reform 
 
These changes were initiated by Albanian political parties with the strong support of the international partners who used 
the EU integration process as an instrument to push for them. This was the reason why the constitutional changes were 
adopted unanimously by all of the 140 MPs. 
These amendments had the following main characteristics (i) cosmetic changes that clarified various issues 
handled "hastily“ in the existing Constitution; (ii) fundamental changes to the justice system; and (iii) necessary changes 
stemming from the fundamental changes. 
In all these changes, it is clear that the justice reform is included in the second set of changes. This group argues 
that the existing institutions of the justice system are inefficient because the existing Constitution cannot ensure their 
smooth functioning. The same group intervenes in the Constitutional Court16 and touches aspects of its organisation and 
functioning. In fact, the essence of this reform has three benchmarks: (i) self-governance of the justice system; (ii) 
composition of the justice system; and (ii) architecture of the justice system.  
In this view, the amendments of the first and third group could have been adopted in Parliament, as the case was, 
without the need for popular vote through a constitutional referendum. But, the amendments of the second group affect 
the existing Constitution deeply, i.e. its chapter about justice, and should have been based on a popular referendum. 
People's say in such a referendum would have had at least two advantages: (i) it creates a solid tradition that 
Constitutional changes may be introduced only through popular referendum; and (ii) a massive in favour vote in the 
referendum is a serious discouragement to anyone who seeks to slow down this vital reform for Albania. Obviously, 
politicians thought that parliamentary adoption of the constitutional changes was the best option to gain time, because the 
justice reform had to be accelerated, being a condition for the opening of accession talks for Albania's adherence to the 
EU. So, contrary to the popular wise saying that the shortest way is the longest way, the politicians fell in the trap of time. 
So big are the objections that it is not clear yet when implementation of the justice reform is going to kick off. 
The main reason behind the objections seems to be related to the legal framework stemming from the 
constitutional amendments adopted unanimously, particularly to the Vetting Law that regulates the audit of wealth of 
judges at any level. Besides, once these amendments were adopted in the Parliament, justice experts clearly stated that 
representatives of the political sphere or stakeholders would resist to the implementation of this reform, despite the 
adoption of these constitutional amendments17. 
                                                            
15 Avdiu F.- former Chair of High Court, Judicial Power in the Republic of Albania –achievements and challenges in the reform process, 
Telegraf newspaper, 30 July 2012 
16 Law no. 99/2016, “On some addenda and amendments to Law no. 8577, dated 10.2.2000 ‘On the organisational and functioning of the 
Constitutional Court”, September 2016.  
17 Hazizaj S., “Justice reform and post-reform challenges”, Interview for Radio Deutsche Welle, 29 July 2016. 
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And quite promptly, the political opposition sent the Vetting Law to the Constitutional Court for consideration and 
was not confirmed by the President of the Republic. This Court sent it for competence to the Venice Commission. It was 
the Commission which proposed the law in the first place; therefore it is providing an opinion in favour of it. Then, another 
claim was raised: the document sent to Venice had translation mistakes. Immediately, an association of judges re-sent 
the law for consideration to the Constitutional Court. 
The reasons of such resistance are not very clear, probably influenced by several  political reasons, given the 
upcoming elections next year.  
Evidently, most publications by justice experts notice their sometimes silent and "professional" resistance to in-
depth reformation. The proposed system is labelled "experimental", unknown to any democratic country, and the reform 
presents challenges that need to be tackled; what compromised the actual system is the poor enforcement of the laws 
which are recognised as embedding the best international standards; some changes could be made in courts and 
prosecution offices to prevent overlapping actions. The main argument is that the system is experimental and, as in any 
experiment, you might succeed or you might fail. Then, there comes a clear warning: the reform is becoming like a fragile 
creation, things are attempting to be done without much maturity by passing consultation with representatives of courts 
and prosecution offices18.  
From all these "arguments", it is obvious that the judges tend to maintain the status quo of the existing system, 
implying that allegations about their conflict of interest probably have some grounds, after all. 
The justice reform is wrongly perceived as a ‘one-stop-shop’ reform. In fact, it is a deep and continuous reform that 
must not be limited to the Vetting Law. It only starts off with this law. Therefore, it is very important that anyone has a 
thorough understanding of the reform, the expectations from it would be more realistic.  
However, this reform seems to be indispensable and is expected impatiently by all, including international 
partners19. But, nobody has been able to provide a clear answer to questions like when will the reform start from, or when 
will the public feel the effects of justice reform20.  
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Constitutional amendments must be technically reasoned and should not be made based only on political arguments and 
for narrow-sighted political interest. Because, the Constitution must not be considered as the fundamental document for 
parties, but for the State and citizens. 
Selected procedure governing the amendments should be clear, transparent to all and binding. Crucial 
constitutional amendments must be adopted in Parliament and be confirmed by a popular referendum. 
Other amendments could be adopted simply by the Parliament. But the Constitution must clearly provide for each 
processes; at least, by stipulating some selection criteria in order to avoid interpretations driven by political interests.  
The impact of any constitutional amendments must be measured periodically. For this, a monitoring unit at the 
President's Office ought to be established to report to the Parliament each year about the impact of such changes. Such 
a report would also prevent any a priori assessments made by political parties of constitutional changes made. 
All must adhere to the justice reform, most of all politicians and judges. They must know the reform in detail. An 
Action Plan outligning the steps for the implementation of the reform would be useful to both politicians and the public at 
large. 
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